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Males of many species help in the care and provisioning of offspring, and these investments often correlate with
genetic relatedness. For example, many human males invest in the children of sisters, and this is especially so where
men are less likely to share genes with children of wives. Although this makes qualitative sense, it has been difficult to
support quantitatively. The prevailing model predicts investment in children of sisters only when paternity confidence
falls below 0.268. This value is often seen as too low to be credible; so investment in sisters’ children represents an
unsolved problem.
I show here that the prevailing model rests on a series of restrictive assumptions that underestimate relatedness to
sisters’ children. For this reason, it understates the fitness payoff to men who invest in these children. This effect can
be substantial, especially in societies with low confidence in paternity. But this effect cannot be estimated solely from
confidence in paternity. One must also estimate the probability that two siblings share the same father.
1. Introduction
In species with male parental care, it makes sense that
males would direct that care toward offspring with whom
they share genes. Male Dunnocks, for example, often pro-
vision the young of several females, and the rate at which
they provision each clutch closely matches their likely
share of its paternity [1]. Similarly, many human males in-
vest in the children of sisters rather than in those of wives,
and this practice may be most widespread where extra-
marital mating is common [2–6]; but see [7–9].
This human example was first approached in a quan-
titative way during the 1970s. In that decade, quantita-
tive models were introduced by Alexander [10], Greene
[11], and Greene [12]. I will refer to these as models A74,
G78, and G80. Their common goal was to specify con-
ditions under which men are genetically closer to sisters’
children than to those of wives. The point at which they
are equally close is called the “paternity threshold” [11,
p. 153]. These authors assumed that selection would favor
investment in sisters’ children only when paternity confi-
dence is below this threshold. The three models disagreed
about its numerical value. The lowest value—0.268—was
that of the G78 model. This model has become enshrined
in the literature.
The others have been less influential. The A74 model
was used in two publications [13, 4] and the G80 model
(without attribution) in one [14], but neither has been used
since the 1980s.
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The G78 model, on the other hand, continues to influ-
ence thinking. Anthropologists have extended it to various
types of relative [2, 15] and across several generations
[5, 6]. It also shows up in economic literature [14]; [16,
pp. 1923–1924]. It is used in recent literature to argue that
transfers to sisters’ children compromise the reproductive
interests of husbands [17, p. 109]; [18, p. 157].
It is not clear, however, that the paternity threshold pro-
vides a useful way to think about paternal investment. In
the first place, it is hard to believe that paternity certainty
is often as low as the model requires [5, 4]. Furthermore,
many forms of parental investment may exhibit decreas-
ing returns to scale. In other words, the benefit from an
additional unit of investment in any given offspring may
decline with each unit invested. Where this is so, we might
expect men to distribute investment among multiple off-
spring, weighting that investment in favor of those with
whom they are most likely to share genes. Furthermore,
the optimal behavior of males will depend in part on the
responses of females. Neither of these complexities is ac-
comodated by the paternity threshold model.
They are central, however, to recent game theoretic
analyses [19, 20]. Those show that selection can favor in-
vestement in sisters’ children even when paternity con-
fidence is well above the paternity threshold. Yet these
models also use the G78 model in calculating fitness pay-
offs [19, Supp. Mat., p. 8]; [20]. That model thus contin-
ues in importance.
In what follows, I argue that all three models (A74,
G78, and G80) make restrictive assumptions. Some of
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not to have been noticed. All of them distort our views
about the relatedness of men to sisters. These distortions
may have biased the conclusions of all the work men-
tioned above.
This article will not try to explain investment by males
in sisters’ children. It will deal only with questions of re-
latedness, a more limited project that may prove useful in
the larger one.
2. Materials and methods
Most quantitative work on this subject has used the coef-
ficient of relatedness. I work instead with the coefficient
of kinship [21, p. 121]—the probability that two genes,
drawn at random from each of two relatives, are copies of
the same gene in some given ancestral generation. In the
absence of inbreeding, the coefficient of kinship equals
half the coefficient of relatedness. We are interested in two
of these coefficients, which describe the genetic kinship of
a man to the children of (i) his wife and (ii) his sister.
These coefficients depend on two probabilities, which
may vary among families. The first of these—p, or pater-
nity confidence—is the probability that a child’s father is
his mother’s husband. The other is h, the probability that
two siblings share the same father. The value of h is rel-
evant because it affects the genetic relatedness of a man
(Ego) to his sister’s children. This value depends on pa-
ternity confidence, but not that provided by Ego’s wife.
It depends instead on the paternity confidence provided
by Ego’s mother to her husband. The value of h also de-
pends on the number of a woman’s husbands [20]. I as-
sume throughout that women have only one. Finally, I as-
sume that Ego does not know values specific to his own
family and must rely instead on population averages, p¯
and h¯.
Within a family, the coefficient of kinship of Ego with
his wife’s child is φ1 = p/4, whereas that with his sister’s
child is φ2 = (1+ h)/16. A man shares more genes with
the child of a sister than with that of a wife when φ2 > φ1,
or equivalently when h > 4p−1. This condition refers to
an individual family but also holds on average, if p and h
are replaced by p¯ and h¯. The shaded regions in Fig. 1 show
the combinations of h¯ and p¯ that satisfy this inequality.
Consider a family within which the probability of pater-
nity is p. With probability p2, two random siblings were
fathered by the husband, and with probability (1− p)2 nei-
ther was. In the second case, both may have been fathered
by the same extrapair1 male. Let b represent the condi-
tional probability of this event, given that neither sib was
1I use the term “extrapair” rather than “extramarital,” because re-
lationships that produce children need not be sanctioned as marriages.
Nonetheless, I assume that one male is primary and refer to him as the
“husband.”
Table 1: Assumptions that underlie each model. The mod-
els differ with respect to assumptions about two param-
eters, Vp (the variance across families in paternity confi-
dence), and b¯ (the mean probability that two siblings share
an extrapair father, if neither was fathered by the mother’s
husband). The first of these ranges from 0 to p¯(1− p¯) and
the second from 0 to 1. Each model can be derived by
setting each parameter either to its highest or its lowest
feasible value. The A74 model can also be derived from
assumptions that imply intermediate values of the two pa-
rameters. “Upper bound” (UB) is the model with the high-
est possible paternity threshold.
Assumption
Model Abbrev. Vp b¯
Greene [11] G78 0 0
Greene [12] G80 0 1
Alexander [10] A74 p¯(1− p¯) 0
Upper bound UB p¯(1− p¯) 1
fathered by the husband. With these definitions,
h = p2+(1− p)2b, (1)
For an average family,
h¯ = p2+(1− p)2b
= p¯2+Vp+(1− p)2b (2)
where the overbars represent averaging over families, and
Vp = p2− p¯2 is the variance among families in p.
3. Results
This section will (a) derive the assumptions that under-
lie the three published models, and then relax assump-
tions involving (b) the distribution of sexual access among
extrapair mates, and (c) variation of paternity confidence
among families.
(a) Assumptions of the classical models
The three models make differing claims about h¯:
A74: h¯ = p¯ (3)
G78: h¯ = p¯2 (4)
G80: h¯ = p¯2+(1− p¯)2 (5)
Each of these results can be derived by setting b¯ and Vp
to values at the edges of their feasible ranges, that is, by
setting each parameter either to its highest or its lowest
feasible value.
Because b is a probability, it must lie between 0 and 1,
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(a) Paternity confidence constant across families.
Curves G78 and G80 represent the models of Greene [11]
and Greene [12]. The other two curves assume that women
have 5 extrapair mates, with whom the frequency of mat-
















































































































































































































































































(b) Paternity confidence varies among fami-
lies. Curve A74 shows the Alexander model. The
other curves assume that b = 1 and that for each
family, p is drawn from a Beta distribution with
mean p¯. Labels show the variance of this distribu-
tion as a fraction of the maximum possible vari-
ance, p¯(1− p¯). Curve UB shows the upper bound,
at which the paternity threshold reaches its maxi-
mal value, 0.5.
Figure 1: Effect of average paternity confidence (p¯) on the average probability (h¯) that two sibs share a father. In the
shaded regions, men share more genes with the child of a sister than with that of a wife. Paternity thresholds of several
models are indicated by bullets (•). For these thresholds, the value of p¯ is shown in parentheses.
women never mate with the same extrapair male twice, or
(equivalently) when each woman has an infinite number
of such mates. On the other hand, b¯ = 1 when no woman
has more than a single extrapair mate. The variance, Vp,
must lie between 0 and p¯(1− p¯). It attains the lower value
when all women have the same fraction of extrapair mat-
ings. The upper value occurs when p = 1 for a fraction p¯
of women (who always mate with their husbands), and
p = 0 for the rest (who never do). In summary, b¯ lies
within the range [0,1] and Vp within [0, p¯(1− p¯)].
Consider what happens when we substitute these upper
and lower feasible values into Eqn. 2. The result equals (3)
when b¯ = 0 and Vp = p¯(1− p¯), equals (4) when b¯ =Vp =
0, and equals (5) when b¯ = 1 and Vp = 0. Thus, models
A74, G78, and G80 can each be derived by setting b¯ and
Vp equal to values at the limits of their feasible ranges.
The A74 model also holds if p≤ 1/2, and b = p/(1− p)
within each family, for then Eqn. 1 reduces to h = p, and
averaging over families gives h¯ = p¯ (Eqn. 3).
These results are summarized in table 1. For the G78
model, the assumptions discussed above are necessary as
well as sufficient. Those for the A74 and G80 models are
sufficient but may not be necessary: they may hold also
under other assumptions. None, however, have ever been
described. The assumptions discussed above are the only
ones under which these models are known to hold. Let
us ask now what happens when these assumptions are re-
laxed. Section (b) considers the possibility that siblings
share paternity through an extrapair male.
(b) Extrapair paternity
This section focuses on the probability, b, that two siblings
share a father, given that neither was fathered by their
mother’s husband. It will be useful to simplify the other
parts of the model, so let us follow Greene [11, 12] in as-
suming that p and b are constant across families. In this
context, there is no distinction between values for families
and averages across families, so I omit the overbars.
It is easy to derive the minimum and maximum feasible
values of h. Eqn. 1 implies that h increases with b, for any
given p. Consequently, the minimum h occurs when b= 0
and the maximum when b= 1. These correspond to curves
G78 and G80 in Fig. 1(a). These curves provide lower and
upper bounds on the value of h, provided that p and b are
constant across families. When families vary, however, we
will see below that h¯ can be even larger than G80 would
imply.
Between the two extremes, b= 0 and b= 1, the value of
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and the distribution of matings among them. To model this
effect, let gi represent the fraction (among all extrapair
matings of a given woman) of matings with the ith male.
Then g2i is the probability that two sibs were both fathered






g2i = 1/k+ kVg (6)
where k is the number of males, 1/k is the mean of the gi,
and Vg = k−1∑i g2i −1/k2 is the variance.
If the wife visits extrapair partners with equal fre-
quency, then b = 1/k, and h = p2 +(1− p)2/k. This re-
duces to model G80 if the wife has just a single extrapair
partner and to model G78 if she has an infinity of them. In
addition to these curves, Fig. 1(a) also includes model E5,
in which the wife allocates matings evenly among 5 ex-
trapair partners. For a given value of p, the figure shows
that h declines as sexual partners become more numerous,
because offspring are then less likely to share paternity
through an extrapair male.
When extrapair males receive uneven allocations, Vg is
large, increasing both b and h, and making siblings more
similar. This makes intuitive sense: variation in the gi im-
plies that a small number of males enjoy disproportionate
mating success, so random pairs of offspring are likely to
share paternity through one of these favored males. To il-
lustrate this effect, Fig. 1(a) includes curve U5, represent-
ing the case of 5 extrapair males who get sexual access in
proportion to 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, and 1/16. Because of this
unevenness, curve U5 is higher than E5.
As each of the curves in Fig. 1(a) passes from the
shaded to the unshaded region, p¯ passes what Greene [11,
p. 153] called the “paternity threshold”—the “p below
which a male is more related to his sister’s offspring than
to his spouse’s.” Because of the slope of the boundary, the
smallest and largest thresholds are those for the lowest and
highest curves on the page. These two extremes—models
G78 and G80—imply thresholds of 0.268 [11] and 0.382
[12].
So far, we have seen that relatedness to sisters (and
thus to sisters’ offspring) increases if the mother has a
small number of extrapair partners or allocates matings
unevenly among them. Furthermore, the figure shows that
these effects can be quite large. The next section considers
another influence—variation among families in paternity
confidence.
(c) Variation in paternity confidence
The fraction of children fathered by the current husband
will ordinarily vary among families. In such cases, p and h
are random variables, and attention turns to their averages,
p¯ and h¯. To obtain an upper bound on h¯, assume that b= 1
for all women. Then Eqn. 2 becomes
h¯ = 1−2 p¯(1− p¯)+2Vp
When the variance (Vp) among families is large, h¯ will
also be large. To illustrate this effect graphically, I assume
that p is drawn randomly for each family from a beta dis-
tribution with mean p¯. In Fig. 1(b), the curves labelled
0.1, 0.5, and 0.9 refer to models with increasing variance
among families. The larger the variance, the higher the
probability (h¯) that two siblings share a father.
The maximal value of h¯ occurs when b = 1 for all
women, and Vp is at its maximal value, p¯(1− p¯). In this
case, h¯= 1, whatever the value of p¯. The paternity thresh-
old attains its largest possible value, 1/2. This model is
shown as curve UB in Fig. 1(b).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
It has been understood for four decades that paternity cer-
tainty increases the relatedness of men to the children of
wives and sisters [10]. But relatedness to sisters’ children
also responds to other influences, which have not been
appreciated. It is greater when women have few extra-
pair partners, allocate matings unevenly among them, and
when paternity confidence varies among families. Pub-
lished models involve restrictive assumptions about all
these influences.
These assumptions underlie an old debate about the
correct form of the relationship between paternity cer-
tainty and relatedness to sisters’ children. Various authors
disagreed about which functional form was correct [11,
p. 153]; [2, pp. 151–152]; [13, p. 321]; [4, pp. 443–444].
The present work shows that all are correct—they simply
involve different assumptions.
When spelled out, these assumptions seem remarkably
restrictive. They include (i) that paternity confidence is the
same in each family (G78, G80), (ii) that women never
mate twice with the same extrapair male (A74, G78),
(iii) that some women always mate with their husbands,
but the rest never do (A74), and (iv) that no woman mates
with more than one extrapair male (G80). Each of these
assumptions is unrealistic, and each biases estimates of
genetic relatedness. The assumptions (i and ii) of the G78
model both bias results downward. Consequently, this
model provides only a lower bound on the relatedness
of men to sisters’ children. Current theory relies on this
model and thus underestimates the fitness payoff to males
who invest in such children. The upper bound on relat-
edness occurs when assumptions iii and iv both hold. At
this upper bound, all siblings share paternity, because no
sibship has more than one biological father.
Presumably, real populations lie somewhere between
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there is no single paternity threshold—no single value of p¯
at which men are equally related to children of wives and
of sisters. Instead, the paternity threshold varies among
populations between 0.268 (the lower bound) and 0.5 (the
upper). Even under the most generous conditions, the pa-
ternity threshold requires a very low confidence in pater-
nity.
The present results also bear on recent game-theoretic
analyses. Fortunato & Archetti [19] studied the evolution
of monogamous marriage and “vertical transfer,” i.e. in-
vestment in the children of wives. In calculating fitness
payoffs, they used the assumptions of the G78 model. As
we have seen, this minimizes the payoff from investing
in sisters’ children. Consequently, their model may over-
state the stability of vertical transfers. Similarly, Fortunato
[20] shows that selection can favor investment in sisters’
children even when p > 1/2. This conclusion is conserva-
tive, because it also relies on the G78 model. Investment
in sisters’ children would evolve even more easily if the
assumptions of this model were relaxed.
We can estimate men’s kinship, p¯/4, to wives’ off-
spring directly from the population-wide average pater-
nity confidence, p¯. But we cannot estimate kinship to sis-
ters’ children from this value alone. It may lie anywhere
between the lower and upper bounds, (1+ p¯2)/16 and
1/8. The difference between these bounds decreases with
increasing values of p¯. Among the Himba, for example,
Scelza [22] estimates that p¯= 0.83. This implies that kin-
ship to sisters’ children is between 0.106 and 0.125, a
range of 18%. Had p¯ been lower—say 1/2—the range of
uncertainty would have been 60%.
Without measuring, one cannot know where within this
range of uncertainty any real population lies. To remove
the uncertainty, we need separate estimates of paternity
confidence (p¯) and also of the probability (h¯) that two
siblings share a father.
I am grateful for comments from Ryan Bohlender,
Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Elizabeth Cashdan, Mark
Flinn, Laura Fortunato, Henry Harpending, Kristen
Hawkes, and Michael Lewis.
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